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LLOYD STEFFEN 
 
 
 The Moral and Spiritual Challenge 
 of Capital Punishment 
 
 
  In January 1998, Karla Faye Tucker became the second woman 
in thirty-one years to be legally executed in the United States. Only a 
few weeks ago in Jasper, Texas, a white man, John William King, 24, 
was sentenced to death for the brutal and racially-motivated murder of 
James Byrd, a black man. On Christmas day, 1998, Pope John Paul II 
called for an end to the death penalty, reiterating that call on January 
27, 1999 before a crowd of 100,000 at the Trans World Dome in St. 
Louis, Missouri: ``I renew the appeal I made most recently at 
Christmas for a consensus to end the death penalty, which is both 
cruel and unnecessary. Modern society,'' he went on, ``has the means 
of protecting itself, without definitively denying criminals the chance to 
reform.'' 
 All three of these stories were widely reported. All three stories 
pertained to the practice of state-sponsored execution in the United 
States. All three stories could provoke some deep questions about the 
moral meaning of the death penalty, but I ask, did any of these three 
actually do so? My perception is that most Americans believed the 
John William King death sentence was a just desert for a horrendous 
crime; that Karla Faye Tucker's execution, though more problematic, 
was just if the central issue were her actual crime and not how she 
reformed; that the Pope's remarks expressed religious ideals that are 
not binding in secular America and which are even marginal for many 
American Roman Catholics, many of whom are ambivalent about 
capital punishment. 
 In coming to speak with you about the moral and religious 
meaning of the death penalty, I want to present what I think are the 
critical moral questions involved in each of these three stories. I seek 
to demonstrate how we can investigate this topic as a moral  
_______________ 
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issue worthy of our time and effort; and because the death penalty is a 
symbol and much of the energy for death penalty support derives from 
religious sources and sanctions, I will attend briefly to the role religious 
belief can play in providing moral warrants for execution practice. 
 
 Moral Issues 
 
 Since moral truth is never finally a question of majority 
preference, the first thing we must do is avoid appeal to popular 
sentiment and polling data as a simple determiner of moral meaning. 
Having said that, let me remind you that thirty years ago opinion polls 
showed Americans equally divided over the death penalty. That is no 
longer the case. Support for capital punishment nationally runs at 
around 72%, and there are some counties in Texas, the state that 
executes most regularly, where support is over 90%.1 What has led to 
this high level of support for capital punishment? 
 Is it that execution has caused a decrease in murder rates so that a 
common good for all of society is advanced? States that have the death 
penalty continue to have murder rates twice the rate of those that have 
abolished it. 
 Is it that keeping murderers alive for decades is an extravagantly 
expensive and execution provides a necessary economy and cheaper 
alternative to incarceration when tax dollars are scarce? Execution 
continues to cost from five to six times what a forty-year life sentence 
would cost. The state of Indiana recently released an estimate that it 
could save five million dollars a year if it rid itself of the death penalty, 
savings, incidentally, that might be put into support for the work of law 
enforcement officials.2 
 Is it because the death penalty is one way America can continue to 
show solidarity with other societies who share our deepest political 
aspirations and cultural values? Every Western democracy except the 
United States has abolished the death penalty, and countries that 
continue to use it ─ China, Iran, Iraq ─ are regularly cited for human 
rights violations. One of the first things South Africa did when 
apartheid ended was abolish the harshest instrument of white rule that 
was used primarily against blacks, the death penalty. 
 The death penalty is not an object of fierce and spirited debate in 
American society today: it is an accepted practice. If the above reasons, 
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which are reasonable reasons for lending the practice support, fail to 
justify the practice, why is it so widely accepted? There are two reasons 
I will offer. 
 The first is that many Americans do not trust the criminal justice 
system to dispense justice and thus protect innocent citizens from 
crime. The average time served for committing a criminal homicide is 
less than that spent on drug dealing offenses and the average murderer 
is released after only 6½ years.3 In light of that reality, execution begins 
to look like a ``final solution'' that assures that an offender who 
threatens society will never do so again. 
 I understand this, but I would remind you that murder is the least 
repeated felony crime. Only about 1½% of those who commit 
America's 22-23,000 murders per year are sentenced to death. The 
claim that our criminal justice system fails to deliver justice is no 
argument for justifying the direct, deliberate, and intentional killing of 
an individual human person by the state, since a flawed criminal justice 
system should be expected to be flawed in capital cases as well. 
Supporting execution as a way to compensate for the inadequacies of a 
criminal justice system constitutes, in Wittgenstein's language, a 
``category mistake.'' Failure of a criminal justice system to deliver 
justice and protect the innocent, while a worthy topic for debate and 
political involvement, is not an argument for overturning what morality 
ordinarily presumes cannot be justified and therefore condemns: the 
direct and intentional killing of a member of our moral community. 
 The second reason why I think so many people support the death 
penalty is this: it is justice ─ simple justice, proportional justice, a just 
retribution imposing the most serious penalty on the most serious 
crime. 
 What moral assumptions allow us to conclude that the death 
penalty is simple justice? I will grant that on first glance it looks that 
way, but information and understanding of America's death penalty 
system may go far toward dispelling that initial impression; and I really 
do believe that because Americans in general do not understand 
capital punishment and how it works, we are as citizens oblivious to its 
moral challenge. But there is a moral challenge, and I want to present 
a case for thinking about that challenge. I will to begin by rehearsing 
briefly some of the arguments for capital punishment and show what 
would undo them as strong arguments; then I want to try a different 
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way of thinking about capital punishment, and ask if you think this is a 
better way to think about the subject, a better theory than the others. I 
shall outline a theory of what I call ``just execution,'' and it is in that 
discussion that we can revisit those three stories with which we began ─ 
the Karla Faye Tucker execution, the King sentencing, and the recent 
papal pronouncements. 
 
 Religious Sanction 
 
 What are typical defenses of capital punishment? Since lots of 
people are guided in their moral thinking by religion, we should at least 
mention religious ethics and its attendant moral theory ─ divine 
command. Divine command is the theory that provides philosophical 
support for acting from religious motives. The foundational question 
of ethics is this: Why do you do what you do? In divine command 
theory, the answer, which is powerful and in some versions 
philosophically defensible, is this: because God told me to. 
 So here is a first reason to support capital punishment: God 
commands it; God even seems to like it. In Western religion, in fact, 
of the 613 commandments that comprise the teaching of law in the 
Hebrew Bible, 36 of those laws approve of execution for certain 
offenses. Before blithely accepting this justification, remember some of 
the offenses for which you could be killed besides murder: cursing 
your parents, striking your parents (Exodus 21:15); trespassing on 
sacred areas (Exodus 19:12); profaning the Sabbath (Numbers 15:32; 
would our weekend football and basketball games constitute such a 
profanation?); adultery, blasphemy, false prophecy (who would risk 
going into meteorology, even with Doppler radar?), and negligence (if, 
after being warned that your ox is dangerous, it gores someone to 
death, you are to die: think about how many automobile industry 
executives would be executed for not getting a recall notice out soon 
enough to prevent a death by mechanical fault). 
 These scriptural references do not represent Jewish teaching, for 
the religion of Judaism has strong traditions of opposition to capital 
punishment, and in Christianity, the Gospels tell of Jesus interfering to 
prevent a legal execution over adultery; of Jesus repudiating the ancient 
rule of ``an eye for an eye''; and Jesus asking God to forgive his 
executioners, since Jesus obviously thought it was not in his power to 
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do so and the offense of execution was ultimately against God. 
 Many Christians today support capital punishment, but my 
argument is that this is because Christian theology has transformed the 
cross from a brutal instrument of Roman terror and political 
oppression into a sublimated good. Christian theology affirms that the 
cross was by divine action rendered the instrument for the atoning 
work of the Christ by whose blood God is reconciled to humanity. 
The cross as symbol directs our attention not so much to death as to 
life and salvation: it became the admittedly harsh but nonetheless 
necessary instrument that effects salvation ─ yours, mine, that of the 
whole cosmos. With so many positive and life-affirming associations 
attached to it, the cross has been rendered in our theological thinking 
as a very good thing. A certain reasonable ambivalence thus attaches to 
the cross as instrument of state terror, and given that the cross is 
transformed into a positive instrument of divine atonement and 
acceptable sacrifice, it is no wonder that Christians are not immediately 
repulsed at the thought of execution. I continue to imagine, I might 
add, that the Jesus whom we are told buckled under the weight of his 
cross, did not go to his death secretly joyful that he was about to effect 
a cosmic reconciliation between a sinful humanity and a God whose 
justice couldn't be reached any other way than by the sacrifice of 
innocent blood.4 
 My immediate point is that religion is a primary sanction for the 
death penalty. ``Thou shalt not kill'' means you should not kill unless 
the killing can be justified, and any killing that God approves is 
automatically justified ─ including for profaning the Sabbath or cursing 
your parents. Upon examination it is not so clear what God's will is in 
the matter of execution: the one time God directly deals with a 
murderer and dispenses justice personally ─ the Genesis story of Cain 
─ God refuses to demand of the murderer life for life. What God's will 
is on state- or community-authorized execution is an interpretive issue 
that undergoes revision in Judaism and Christianity over time. 
Although I cannot claim to know for certain God's final view on the 
appropriateness of the death penalty, I do find it significant that the 
Jesus presented in the Gospels is presented as one who explicitly 
repudiated ``eye for an eye' thinking, who nowhere endorses the right 
of the state to execute, and who himself was condemned by the state ─ 
the Roman state ─ to death for the crime of sedition. 
5
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 Deterrence 
 
 But there are other arguments: deterrence, for example. 
Execution protects society by setting on crime so high a price that the 
thought of being put to death deters you, that is, it prevents you from 
committing the crime. A major proponent of this theory, John Stuart 
Mill, a nineteenth-century English philosopher, thought that the 
foundation of deterrence was psychological arousal. In other words, 
the thought of death must be so terrible against the background of 
normal life that it presents a horrendous prospect that would 
psychologically arouse a susceptible and tempted individual to refrain 
from murder. 
 Deterrence has problems as an argument, since there is no 
evidence that those who commit murder in a moment of passion give 
any thought to consequences; and those who commit more sinister, 
premeditated murder are convinced they'll never get caught. But the 
problem I want to pose is this: How in a society like ours do we 
provoke psychological arousal and a sense of horror sufficient to 
prevent a murder? Is execution really so fearful? Does arousal come 
from thinking about the execution, which is now not a boiling in oil or 
a hanging followed by being drawn in four directions by horses and 
dismembered, then having one's intestines shoveled out of your body 
for you to see before dying as molten lead is poured into your 
abdominal cavity? That medieval execution method might even work a 
little today against the backdrop of the latest slasher film or tonight's 
top news story in Philadelphia, which is likely to be a murder. But 
routine violence and commonplace murder have desensitized us ─ 
have they not? ─ robbing us of the capacity for the arousal deterrence 
requires? 
 Consider that murder is not only familiar in our environment: it's 
the centerpiece of our entertainment. The average child growing up in 
America will by the age of 18 witness in the media 16,000 murders and 
over 200,000 acts of violence.5 Against that background of violence, 
how do you generate sufficient psychological arousal to create horror 
at the thought of execution? How do you generate a deterrence effect 
based on horror when we execute people in secret, and then do so by 
giving them an IV? Is an IV so scary that it would deter a murderer? Is 
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the thought of drifting off to permanent sleep by an IV so horrible a 
prospect that it makes us shudder just thinking about it, so much so 
that we know for certain that we would not kill another human being 
for fear of facing such a terrible death? 
 
 Just Retribution 
 
 Deterrence is often heard and still appealed to, but there is no 
evidence of a deterrent effect, which would be a plausible justification 
for capital punishment. How about another argument: just retribution? 
For committing a murder, the killer must die. Why? Because, as the 
Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant said, by killing another, 
you forfeit your own life on a principle of simple proportionate justice. 
Justice requires the execution. What harm you visit on another should, 
as a fair and just response, be visited on you as proportionate 
punishment: it's the Golden Rule. Kant went so far as to say that by 
entering into society and its system of justice administration, while you 
wouldn't will your own execution, you, as a citizen possessed of the 
right to be treated with respect and protected from interference, 
implicitly consent to the forfeiture of your own life as just punishment 
for the crime of willfully taking the life of another. 
 This may sound like a defensible reason, and, as I say, I think this 
is one of the reasons people commonly advance to justify the death 
penalty. But there are some problems. Kant believed that murderers 
must die because justice demands it and that every murder is morally 
equivalent to every other murder ─ so that equal and proportionate 
justice requires on principle that every murderer be put to death. 
There are, as I said, 22,000 murders in America every year, and we 
put on death row about 300 people, or about 1½%. Kant's theory 
would have us dispense death to 22,000 individuals a year, for if you 
take a life you lose your life. 
 Americans may want more executions, but would we tolerate 
22,000 a year? We would have to resort to king-size multiple-use 
poisoning gurneys and retire electric chairs and build electric couches. 
I am willing to assert, in a hopeful and optimistic frame of mind, that 
an around-the-clock, day-in-day-out killing operation that piled up 
22,000 corpses a year for a crime where currently the average sentence 
is 6½ years would offend Americans' aesthetic, if not moral, 
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sensibilities. 
 But that is not even the biggest problem. The one thing Kant 
never seemed to have considered is that the system of justice 
administration would execute an innocent person. Kant's moral 
philosophy could not justify the execution of an innocent person, and 
he went out of his way to argue against the kind of moral thinking that 
would allow the death of an innocent person as an acceptable loss. A 
wrongful killing would be impossible to justify, for in Kant's 
philosophy, to engage in any behavior required that the rule or maxim 
governing that behavior be made akin to a universal law. By consenting 
to the proposition that ``Executions must proceed even if they 
occasionally kill an innocent,'' you would have to agree that the 
innocent person ─ even if it were only one ─ could be you, or your 
mom or dad, or another loved one. You would have to consent to that 
─ it would have to be any innocent person, any individual from the 
class of innocent persons; and you, if you support the acceptable loss 
theory, could not distinguish one innocent from another. You would 
have to consent not only to your own wrongful execution, but that of 
those you love. 
 Kant himself would not agree to this on principle, for on his 
theory it would be contradictory to say that killing the innocent is 
unjust, which it is (and all reasonable persons know it to be), but that 
execution can be morally justified even when it is unjust. Unjust 
killings, because they cannot be justified, are morally prohibited. ``But 
there are not unjust execution killings because we do not execute 
innocent persons,'' you say. You are wrong to say that. Hugo Adam 
Bedau, Michael Radelet, and Constance Putnam in their book, In 
Spite of Innocence, identify 400 wrongful capital convictions this 
century, with 23 of those wrongful capital convictions actually leading 
to executions.6 
 Since the moratorium on executions was lifted in 1976 and 
executions resumed under the Constitution, about 80 individuals who 
have been convicted of murder and put on death row to await 
execution have been released from prison on a finding of innocence 
and wrongful conviction. That statistic reveals why we have an appeals 
process. Our criminal justice system, for all of its perceived flaws has 
one outstanding virtue: it was constructed by individuals who 
understood that it would make mistakes, and the mistake that most 
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needs avoiding is a mistake around execution. Such a mistake cannot 
be righted: it's an irrevocable mistake. If polls in the wake of the first 
O.J. Simpson trial are a reliable guide, most people believe that the 
criminal justice system makes mistakes. It is thus curious why this 
suspicion of a criminal justice system, widely regarded to be 
error-prone, does not seem to translate into suspicion about the 
dispensing of justice in capital cases. Many Americans, the same ones 
who feel victimized by unfairness in their parking tickets or traffic 
violations, blithely accept that no such unfairness arises in capital cases. 
How can the variable of human fallibility, so prevalent in disputes over 
parking tickets, not attach to murder cases? 
 Weighed against the empirical reality of those wrongfully 
convicted and later released from death row upon findings of 
innocence is the counterpoint to a view given its clearest expression by 
Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General of Virginia from 1986-94, who said 
in replying to an appeal to introduce new evidence from a prisoner 
sentenced to death: ``Evidence of innocence is irrelevant.''7 
 The justice administration system makes mistakes. They may be 
rare or not so rare, but Kant only needs one execution of an innocent 
in practice to create havoc for his theory. If confronted with the 
American system of justice administration, I believe Immanuel Kant, 
who articulated the theory that justice requires that killers be killed, 
and who articulated the simple retributive justice argument that holds 
sway for many if not most supporters of the death penalty today, would 
not ─ and could not logically ─ support execution as practiced in 
America today. 
 Just Execution 
 
 Let us turn away from these old arguments and try something new. 
Consider this question: Should the state have the right to kill its own 
citizens? Yes or no. Those who say no may be pacifists or speaking out 
of a religiously-based absolutism, and I have no persuasive argument to 
penetrate the absolutism barrier. So let us take the non-absolutist 
option, which yields a positive response to the question. But then this 
question comes as a rapid follow-up: Should the right of the state to kill 
its own citizens be restricted? ``O yes,'' you say, ``We do not want 
the state to claim some power where it can just dispense death 
capriciously and at a whim. That would be to approve of Hitler's Nazi 
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regime, or Pol Pot or Idi Amin ─ pick your murderous tyrant.'' So then 
the answer is that the right of a state to kill its citizens is a restricted 
right, the kind of right exercised by police officers when they use lethal 
force to defend themselves or to protect innocent citizens in 
threatening situations. The state clearly has the right reasonably in such 
situations as that, but police cannot just kill people deemed 
undesirable. Killing by the state must be restricted to self-defense or to 
protect others. 
 If we are in agreement up to this point let me proceed to ask 
about capital punishment. Does the state have a right to kill citizens 
through capital punishment? You may say yes, but I want to say, 
``Not so fast.'' A police officer who kills in self-defense does so in the 
immediacy of the threat. The officer cannot wait until the offender is 
captured, rendered defenseless, then walk into the offender's cell and 
kill the unarmed, incapacitated offender claiming self-defense. 
 Self-defense may be a just reason to use deadly force, but the 
situation just described hardly warrants a claim of self-defense. Yet that 
is the situation facing the capital offender who has been captured, 
imprisoned, and rendered non-threatening. The threat is not 
immediate, so that the use of lethal force on grounds of self-defense is 
no longer appropriate. What if you kill to protect others? Again, if the 
offender is removed from society and incapacitated so that no threat is 
posed, then society is protected. It would be wrong for a police officer 
to use lethal force on an incapacitated offender for the reason that by 
so doing, society at large was being protected. The threat is gone. 
 What I mean to suggest by these statements is that we do grant the 
state power to use lethal force, and yes, the state may kill its citizens: 
but it is a highly restricted right and if truth be told, we seem to honor 
what I would call a moral presumption or general rule ─ a reasonable 
rule ─ that ordinarily the state ought not to kill its own citizens. Even 
police authorized to use deadly force ought not do so frequently or 
without grave cause, such as self-defense. On this logic, I want to say 
that the foundation for rethinking the moral challenge of capital 
punishment must reside in a common agreement that you and I share, 
namely, that whatever our differences on capital punishment, you and 
I should be able to agree that the state ought not to kill its citizens. We 
agree on this rule, though I acknowledge, as you should, that that rule 
or presumption is not absolute. It admits of exceptions, and the 
10
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question is, ``Is capital punishment an allowable exception to our 
rule?'' 
 A theory of what I call ``just execution'' is a moral theory that says 
that the state ought not, ordinarily, kill its own citizens. By logical 
extension, if the state ought ordinarily not kill its citizens, then neither 
should it, ordinarily, execute them. A moral presumption against the 
use of the state's execution power attaches to the idea that the state 
ought not ordinarily kill its citizens, so that we can say without 
controversy, even in a society that allows capital punishment, that the 
moral presumption at stake in capital punishment is against the use of 
the death penalty. If we use this punishment at all, we want to use it 
rarely, maybe for only the worst of the worst crimes: we don't want to 
use it for jaywalking or traffic violations or robbery or even rape or 
assault. We want to restrict it to murder ─ this is a rather recent 
development historically ─ and the fact that only 300 out of 22,000 
murders a year get to death row indicates just how much we want to 
restrict its use. This restricted use of the death penalty is concrete 
evidence of a societal belief that ordinarily we ought not to execute 
persons, even murderers. It is clear from the American practice of 
execution that observing the presumption against the use of capital 
punishment is what accounts for the fact that we subject only a few and 
then special cases of offenders to capital punishment. 
 Which cases? This is where things get interesting. In light of the 
moral presumption against capital punishment, a theory of just 
execution would specify conditions that would have to be satisfied if 
the presumption against execution were to be justifiably lifted, and 
every time a criminal offender is sentenced to death, we presumably 
do that. We say: ``Here is a case where it is just to impose a death 
sentence: here is a situation in which we can morally justify lifting the 
presumption against the use of the death penalty.'' 
 That is the theory. The theory is one thing, the practice another. 
Let me lay out nine conditions that I think would have to be met in 
practice if we are to impose a death sentence justly: 
 
1.  The punishment must be authorized by competent 
authority. 
2.  There must be a just cause for using it, a grave cause, like 
self-defense. 
11
Steffen: The Moral and Spiritual Challenge of Capital Punishment
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 1999
 LLOYD STEFFEN 
 
26 
3.  The motivation for using it must be justice and not 
vengeance. 
4.  It must be imposed fairly, without discrimination. 
5.  The punishment itself must not be cruel, for respect for 
persons prohibits torture. 
6.  The punishment must not subvert the very value (life) 
that it is supposed to be protecting and promoting. 
7.  It must be a last resort: no other punishment could 
possibly deliver justice adequately short of execution. 
8.  The end being sought must restore the equilibrium of 
justice upset by the offender's crime: the end must be 
the restoration of peace. 
9.  The punishment must not yield an effect out of 
proportion to the end being sought: it should be 
proportionately, the worst punishment for the worst 
crime.8 
 
 If all of these conditions are met, as presumably they are when we 
sentence persons to death and execute them, the execution, on this 
theory, may be deemed just. The American legal system, in my view, 
has appealed to such a moral theory in developing execution policy, 
making executions infrequent and not even a regular punishment for 
murder. When a death penalty is pursued in a particular case, it is 
done so with the sense that the above criteria have been satisfied. The 
law restricts use of the death penalty, requires fairness and 
non-discrimination in imposition, and establishes various conditions 
that must be satisfied in the interests of promoting justice and 
evaluating the moral meaning of execution practice. 
 That is the theory. It is a theory of ``just execution'' that can be 
used to test any particular execution, even the whole system of 
execution. It is a reasonable theory, and it conforms to a system of 
natural law moral thinking originating in Cicero and transmitted to 
Western culture through the Roman Catholic moral tradition, where it 
has been used to frame a theory of, say, a just war. (In ``just war'' 
theory, several conditions are laid out that if met would overturn the 
just war presumption that we ordinarily ought not to use force to settle 
conflicts.) 
 Our American practice of capital punishment does not meet the 
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requirements of the just execution moral theory. For if the conditions 
are not met ─ all of them, all nine ─  then an execution cannot claim 
moral justification. Although some of the criteria can easily be met in 
individual cases, all nine are not ever met in the current practice of 
execution. 
 Fair imposition, for instance, is continually violated. It is violated 
on racial, gender, and class grounds. A disproportionate number of 
persons sent to death row are black and male, and the racial issue 
shows up not so much by looking at the color of death row inmates, 
but by looking at the race of victims. A person who kills a white person 
in the state of Maryland is 11 times more likely to get a death sentence 
than if the victim is black. Why? I suggest racism. The message in that 
statistic, which has correlates across the country and reveals a similar 
attitude toward execution that was found in South Africa, is this: killing 
whites is the crime that overwhelmingly increases the likelihood of a 
death sentence. The General Accounting Office has said that in 82% 
of cases, race of victim was found to influence who would be charged 
with capital murder and eventually receive the death penalty.9 
 If we as American citizens were educated about how the death 
penalty is imposed, we would realize that the truly startling thing about 
the conviction of John William King in Texas is that he was a white 
person sentenced to death for killing a black person. That fact was 
reported in the news as the second time this had happened in Texas, 
but unfortunately it did not lead to a wider discussion about the true 
locale of racial discrimination in death sentencing: that race of victim is 
the deciding factor and the King conviction is noteworthy because it is 
a blatant exception to the rule concerning who receives a death 
sentence. Executing a white person for killing a black person is an 
anomaly in our practice of execution, and despite the fact that this was 
reported, we seem to be focused on the just desert delivered to one 
filled-with-hate and easy-to despise individual, as if that one case can be 
our paradigm of justice. How can we say conclude from one situation 
that justice is imposed in capital cases in a non-discriminatory fashion 
when the death penalty is a societal practice that requires that we look 
at the practice as it is imposed across the society? If you do that, you 
will find, as did the General Accounting Office, that racial 
considerations affect the entire process of arrest, indictment, 
prosecution, jury selection, trial, sentencing, and appeal. The King 
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conviction ought to have opened up a wider conversation about the 
way in which race affects the death sentencing process, but 
unfortunately we let go the fact that this was the second time this has 
happened in Texas history and settled our consciences with the belief 
that impartial justice was delivered. If we look at the King sentencing 
against the historical and social backdrop of execution practice in 
Texas, King is a clear anomaly, so much so that as much as I fear 
saying this, King seems positioned to make a case logically ─ not legally 
─ that since Texas does not execute those who kill black persons, he is 
a victim of racial discrimination in sentencing practices. This terrible 
irony brings home the reality of racial discrimination in America's 
execution practices. 
 But discrimination affects not only race. About 90% of capital 
defendants are indigent, so poor that they cannot afford counsel. They 
thus receive court appointed attorneys, who often are not prepared to 
engage capital law, which is a highly specialized area of criminal law. 
There is a class discrimination surrounding the death penalty, and 
some notable murder cases involving wealthy persons ─ O.J. Simpson 
and the Dupont trial in Philadelphia ─ testify to the role that well--
financed legal defense teams play in keeping capital punishment away 
from clients. 
 And gender is an issue. Of the 532 executions since 1976, only 
three of them have involved women. It was a big story when Texas 
proceeded to execute Karla Faye Tucker, a woman who was articulate 
in interviews, had nice hair and capped teeth, a born-again Christian 
who even married the prison chaplain. What made this Texas 
execution noteworthy was the fact that Karla Faye Tucker was a 
woman, and that is an issue because women are so rarely executed. 
Even in Texas there was serious division over this one. Karla Faye 
Tucker did not seem threatening. This attractive woman who had been 
forced into prostitution as a teenager by her mother found prison the 
best environment she had ever known. And in that environment, she 
flourished and reformed and died truly different from the drug-crazed 
murderer who buried a hatchet in the skull of one of her victims. The 
fact is that many of those on death row have stories like Karla Faye 
Tucker, and many are born-again Christians, as she was. The special 
factor in this case was sex ─ and execution is a gender specific practice, 
a ``male thing,'' if you will, that discriminates along gender lines. 
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 Since 1976, at least 12,000 women in this country have been 
convicted of killing their children, with only 3 or 4 of them sentenced 
to death, so the problem is not a lack of women candidates for 
execution. The point rather is that in a sexist society, it is possible that 
women are not viewed as being fully autonomous moral agents who 
can be held fully accountable for their murders. I only want to point 
out the fact of discrimination: actually, women do not fare well in the 
criminal justice system when the crimes are not capital. But where the 
death penalty is concerned, there is a sex discrimination affecting the 
execution practice, and that is what the Karla Faye Tucker execution 
exhibited: the second woman in thirty-seven years out of the more than 
500 executions that had taken place in those years. A theory of ``just 
execution'' would not allow discrimination on any of these grounds ─ 
race, class, or gender. That one criterion ─ just imposition ─ prohibits 
discrimination and would halt a system of execution infected with 
discrimination. 
 But I mentioned nine criterion, not just one; and these others fail 
as well. 
 In an adversarial system of law, prosecutors will often appeal to 
emotion and thus to vengeance to gain a death sentence. Executions 
rarely bring peace to those who have lost loved ones, and not every 
surviving victim of capital crime wants another death. Executions 
continue to be botched, thus cruel. The fact that execution perpetuates 
the cycle of violence, leading fools to cheer on an execution rather 
than soberly accept the loss of a life as tragic, even when it is a 
murderer's life, gravitates against the criterion that execution honors 
life and does not subvert the value of life. 
 Furthermore, let me reiterate that capital punishment cannot be 
said to be proportional, if by that we mean that we mete out the most 
serious punishment for the most serious crime. We execute for 
murder, but the average murderer in the United States not only avoids 
the death penalty but serves, as I said, only 6½ years in prison. Drug 
offenders on average serve longer sentences. Those facts should force 
the conclusion that our most serious crime is not murder but drug 
offense, and that conclusion can be drawn logically by looking at how 
we put into practice what we value. 
 What all of these things mean is that the American execution 
practice is out of sync with what a theory of just execution would 
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demand; and the one criterion that seems to me never to be met is 
``last resort.'' If a criminal is removed from society and rendered 
non-threatening, and the public is made safe and secure, we thus have 
an alternative to execution. This is precisely the point that Pope John 
Paul II has been making. In making this point he is not making a vague 
appeal to religious ideals but to a criterion of just execution theory. He 
is pointing out that a just execution theory will set a standard for justice, 
then saying that our execution practice does not satisfy the last resort 
criterion. He is thereby pointing to a general moral failure in the 
system of state-sponsored execution. The Pope is also offering the view 
that there are alternatives to execution that will protect society ─ 
criminal perpetrators can be incapacitated by incarceration ─ so that 
execution is not, in fact, a last resort. I would point out that not only is 
last resort challenged by the incarceration alternative mentioned by the 
Pope, but American law has evolved recently to prevent jurors from 
thinking about incarceration as a reasonable option to execution. In 
Pennsylvania, life imprisonment means life without parole in every 
instance where life imprisonment is imposed, and that can be a terrible 
and harsh fate. The Supreme Court, however, has said that states that 
have such a policy do not need to inform jurors that a life sentence 
would keep the offender away permanently, a bizarre decision that 
seems designed to keep the capital punishment system going by means 
of keeping jurors uninformed of their sentencing options. Removing 
options or misleading people into thinking they do not have options 
whereby legitimate societal safety concerns can be fairly evaluated 
violates the spirit of just execution theory, for the theory is all about 
making informed choices in a context of freedom. It was only in such a 
context of freedom that the Pope could evaluate the execution practice 
and determine that the incarceration option suffices to incapacitate 
violent offenders, provide for the public safety, and thus challenge the 
execution practice itself on the basis of the ``last resort'' criterion of 
just execution theory. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
 I came here to say that the death penalty poses a moral challenge. 
The moral challenge of the death penalty concerns the central 
question: Can the killing that occurs when a person is executed by the 
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state be rendered just, that is, can it be deemed a morally justified 
killing? You cannot answer that question without finding out about 
how we actually put a theory of just execution into practice, and the 
American practice of execution does not meet the test of the theory. 
 You and I should be able to agree that the best moral defense of 
execution killing or any kind of killing is self-defense or defense of the 
innocent. But the death penalty is not self-defense, and this is the heart 
of the Pope's moral objection to the death penalty. State-sponsored 
execution is a deliberate and cold-blooded killing of a defenseless and 
powerless individual, who, indeed, may be a terrible human being. The 
argument might then go, ``Well, then, it protects society.'' If the 
average murderer is incarcerated for only 6½ years, the legitimate fear 
of violent criminals being released to kill again is aroused, and it is 
reasonable even for capital punishment opponents to say that those 
who threaten the public safety must be contained. But making sure that 
our criminal justice system delivers justice and incapacitates those who 
threaten the public safety provokes issues that ought to issue in a 
debate about the effectiveness of our criminal justice system. The fact 
that murderers may spend less time in prison than drug offenders is 
not itself a moral justification for execution killing. 
 The problem is that we never seem to get around to talking about 
the criminal justice system because public officials have learned that all 
they have to do to respond to the crime problem and indicate that they 
are ``hard on crime'' is to say ``I support the death penalty'' and thus 
dispense with ideas about what they would do to combat crime and 
strengthen the environment where all of us want to be secure in our 
persons. When I hear public officials responsible for some aspect of 
our justice administration system start talking about the importance 
and necessity of capital punishment in the state's arsenal of 
crime-fighting tools, I assume that they have no ideas, no plan, nothing. 
Capital punishment is code, and in its worst symbolic connotations, it 
is a code that appeals to our fear of those who in this society present 
themselves before the majority as the stranger ─ the poor and the 
racial minority. 
 Execution is not a major cause of death in America, but it is a 
major symbol. The question is, of what? It is offered as a symbol of 
justice, but I am convinced that a study of the death penalty will reveal 
that that is illusion. It is a symbol of power, an ultimate God-like power 
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that human beings should be reluctant to grasp lest they act in pretense 
as if they were God. The death penalty does not conform to the 
requirements of justice and fairness, and the death penalty minus 
justice equals power. Exercising this ultimate power ─ this power to 
take life ─ in pursuit of a perfect justice that is not only irrevocable but 
which mistakenly obliterates the body in punishing the moral 
personality oversteps its bounds, offends justice, models a use of 
violence for solving societal problems, and, theologically, announces 
the death of God. 
 I conclude by reminding you that spirituality is what you do with 
your freedom, so that using your freedom to learn about capital 
punishment is the spiritual challenge that faces you. You will become a 
more informed citizen by so doing. And if you learn about how 
execution policy is put into practice and carried out in your name and 
with your consent, you may become a more morally reflective and 
critical citizen, more apt to raise a moral questions about an issue that 
many will tell you is not really a moral issue at all. ``Of course the 
death penalty is justified, morally justified.'' In that ``of course'' is the 
moral challenge that faces you. 
 
 
 Notes 
 
 1See Bruce Tomaso, ``Texas' Deadly Ritual,'' Dallas Morning News, 
October 1, 1995. 
 2See http://www.vadp.org/info.htm, a site maintained by Virginia Death 
Penalty Information. 
 3See my book, Executing Justice: The Moral Meaning of the Death 
Penalty (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1998), pp. 133-37. 
 4For more on this line of theological interpretation, see Executing Justice, 
pp. 142-69, especially the section on ``The Guilty Jesus.'' 
 5See Carol Ann Campbell, ``A TV Guide for Kids,'' The Record, 
September 15, 1996, A1. 
 6Hugo Adam Bedau, Michael Radelet, and Constance Putnam, In Spite of 
Innocence (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992). 
 7Reported at http://www.vadp.org/quotes.htm. 
 8For a full discussion and critique of these criteria, see Executing Justice, 
pp. 88-141. 
 9For citations to these and other racially related statistics, see my section on 
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``Race'' in Executing Justice, pp. 122-24. 
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